Just in time for the deadline, a rough sketch:
As most probable scenarios have already been tried, let`s have a look at Amaria, a fictitious country in Africa. The population of 20 million is 75% Muslim with an ongoing civil war against the Christian minority of 25 %. Ten years ago Islamic law has been introduced.
Amaria is situated on the Red sea, just opposite Saudi Arabia. The Nile flows through its territory. The country has ample natural resources, most of which remain unexploited. However, Russian and Chinese companies have invested massively and a considerable amount of money has come in.
President El Saad has been indicted before the ICC. The country was officially denounced as a sponsor of state terrorism by the US State Dept. and two chemical factories have been destroyed by cruise missiles.
The political situation is quite volatile, an international intervention has been narrowly averted several times. The only legal party is the Amaric National Party, which is headed by President for life General El Saad who is also head of the armed forces.
Shortly after his indictment the President has assembled his inner cabinet (heads of defence, foreign affairs, the Interservices Intelligence Agency (ISA), economy/finance, science and the chief judge of the Islamic court system).
Only topic: To keep Amaria free and sovereign, a nuclear deterrent is essential.
Three points: explosive device, means of delivery, political strategy / mode of operation.
The options for obtaining at least two to four devices, preferably operationally ready:
1) A possible Chinese connection.
2) The old soviet nuclear establishment.
3) Other rogue operators on the international black market.
4) The Islamic connection: rogue operators in the def/science establishment in Pakistan.
5) Starting a basic production from scratch.
Point 1) is quickly rejected. Despite their support the Chinese would be wary of providing any support as they have no interest in a nuclear armed Amaria which would need less support from them in the Security Council once the devices are operational.
Point 2) seems more promising, however the foreign secretary points that that the rogue operators have been brought under control by the present Russian administration. Furthermore, a second Islamic bomb would not be in the interest of Russia at all.
Point 3) is rejected after the head of ISA and the one of economy/ finance point out that the operators on the international black market just do not have the clout and expertise to provide even parts of a viable device.
Point 4) is vigorously pushed by the head of the Islamic courts with support from ISA, defence and foreign. Although a substantial price could and should be paid to the Islamic brothers in Pakistan, they would have a stronger motivation than just money. Considerable contacts exist already between Amaria and the Islamist members of the relevant organisations in Pakistan. Decision: a first, tentative contact is to be made via religious scholars and the ISA.
Point 5): As this would probably take about a decade at least, it is to run parallel to point 4) with the planning stage to begin at once. ISA and science are to start with the planning.
Means of delivery:
Longer-range missiles and planes are quickly ruled out in view of the stage of technical development in the country. Unconventional solutions must be sought. A maritime suicide attack in case of an invasion of the country can not be ruled out. Possible volunteers for unspecified suicide missions must be found among the more fanatical young Islamic scholars. Targets: The Coast of Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea and as a last resort, the Nile. Further: in case of an attack at least one weapon may be turned over to the Al Quaeda organisation.
Political strategy:
Once the first device is in place and operational, the news of its existence must be leaked to the western MSM, if possible at a time when the US is busy with a crisis elsewhere. The adversary must be convinced that any intervention will end not only in a Somalia-style debacle but a nuclear catastrophe involving the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and the Nile.
Utmost secrecy and speed are of the essence. Next meeting: in 14 days.
So, what are President Al Saad`s chances of success ?
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4 comments:
For a nuclear device El Saad's chances are not good in the short term but may get better in time. He can capitilize on the anti-Western sentiment and open his doors to Islamic terrorist organizations, who he can then work through to get what he wants. That may take time, but it has a chance of working.
The bigger more immediate issue is that El Saad apparently has Bio-Chem capablities and he may resort to using them if his nuclear ambitions are thwarted. With a good agent and good delivery system he can do a lot of damage.
He's a problem that must be delt with.
Fabius---No rush, but when you've prepared your reply to the Iraq War/preemption post of mine, please give me an email (tctribune@gmail.com)and I'll post some summary comments to open the discussion. Then you can post your reponse on the new post I put up.
Let me know if this is okay.
Gooden morgen, FMC ( I hope I've not gotten my Deutsche wrong, correct me if I have ). This post looks fun, let me try to meditate on the possible options el saad has along with the various ramifications. Yours truly bids you a pleasant day ahead!
It's scary. On the bright side I don't think that Iran and Pakistan are interested in rogue elements getting nuclear bombs. As bad as their effects are (one can ruin your whole day) they do not guarantee victory in wars. Nor do they offer any defense against counter attacks.
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